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This chapter deals with zero or implicit internal arguments of predicates which may take one or two internal 
arguments, realizable syntactically. It begins by distinguishing implicit (internal) arguments in terms of a 
predicate’s semantic valency in relation to the syntactic valency of the verb or adjective corresponding to that 
predicate (§2), and continues with an attempt to distinguish three semantic or discourse-referential values 
assumable by null complements (§3). Section 4 then examines one of the three sub-types of null complement 
isolated in §3 (the contextually-definite anaphoric subtype), in an attempt to make precise its anaphoric potential, 
as compared with that of unaccented 3rd person personal pronouns. It is shown that this is a function of an 
interaction amongst the event-type designated by the clause as a whole, the host predicate’s selection restrictions, 
the choice of zero vs. overt pronoun as complement, and wider contextual factors. Finally, section 5 examines the 
role of the host predication as a whole in the functioning of non-referential and anaphoric null complements, and 
attempts to arrive at certain generalisations licensing the possible occurrence of null complements bearing the 




This chapter deals with zero or implicit internal arguments of predicates which may take one 
or two internal arguments, realizable syntactically. There are three essential issues concerning 
the possibility of occurrence and the type of interpretation of null complements. 
First, what are the conditions under which they may occur with various types of 
transitive verbs?  
Second, what are the semantic and referential values which these null complements 
may assume in different contexts? 
                                                
1 I am very grateful to Christopher Butler, Anne Grobet, Daniel García Velasco, Denis Apothéloz, Michelle Noailly, Nancy 
Hedberg, Ron Zacharschi, Ricardo Mairal Usón, an initial anonymous external reviewer and two anonymous John Benjamins’ 
reviewers for their careful reading of earlier drafts of this chapter. A formalized version of this chapter, framed within the 
context of K. Hengeveld’s Functional Discourse Grammar model, was presented at the Seminar on Functional Discourse 
Grammar within the 7th International Conference of the European Society for the Study of English, at the University of 
Saragossa, Spain, on 9th September, 2004. The title of this paper was “Null complements, event structure, predication and 
anaphora: a Functional Discourse Grammar account”. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in the present chapter, as 
well as for any remaining errors, is of course mine alone. A more extended, collaborative project studying the contrast 
between null complements and overt pronouns in natural spoken discourse in French began in June 2003 with Anne Grobet 
(University of Geneva).  
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Third, what are the principles which make these values possible? Clearly, the 
occurrence of null complements needs to be licensed – it is not just any transitive verb, in any 
type of context, which may leave its direct and/or indirect complement(s) unrealized 
syntactically. A satisfactory account of the possibility of non-realisation of one or both of a 
predicate’s internal arguments syntactically, and when this is possible, of the kind of 
interpretation they may receive, requires recognizing the existence of an interaction amongst 
lexical-semantic structure, the construction selected as a whole, and various discourse-
contextual factors.  It is these issues which I will be addressing in what follows.  
I will start by distinguishing implicit (non-first) arguments in terms of a predicate’s 
semantic valency in relation to the syntactic valency of the verb or adjective corresponding to 
that predicate (§2), and will continue with an attempt to distinguish three semantic or 
discourse-referential values assumable by null complements (§3). A third level needs to be 
recognised, in terms of discourse, namely that at which a potential discourse referent is 
evoked, corresponding to the relevant internal argument, and where the entire predication at 
issue has a contextually-specific value as designating an eventuality of some kind (cf. 
Berrendonner, 1995: 216).  Section 4 then mainly examines one of the three sub-types of null 
complement isolated in §3 (the contextually-definite anaphoric subtype), and attempts to make 
precise its anaphoric potential, as compared with that of unaccented 3rd person personal 
pronouns. Section 4 also examines in detail the event-structural, and more generally, 
predicational, values which correlate with the presence of a null complement. Finally, section 
5 attempts to arrive at certain generalisations motivating the three types of values isolated. 
 
2. Semantic vs. syntactic valency and null complements 
 
A distinction is needed at the outset between two conceptions of the notion “(non-first) 
argument”:  on the one hand, non-first arguments of the functor which represents the sense of 
the predicate concerned within the lexical-semantic structure corresponding to this predicate 
(such arguments may or may not be realizable syntactically). These are thus semantic 
arguments; and on the other, non-first arguments of the lexical form of the predicate 
concerned. These arguments are by definition realizable syntactically in conjunction with the 
lexical form concerned, and normally correspond to arguments of the functor within the 
lexical-semantic structure corresponding to the lexical form as potential predicate. They are 
thus syntactic arguments (cf. also Jackendoff, 2002: 138-149 on this distinction). In the case of 
Simon Dik’s version of Functional Grammar (Dik, 1997), this distinction is not explicitly or 
consistently drawn or followed (cf. Cornish, 2002: 256-7), though it is made explicit by Van 
Valin & LaPolla (1997: 27-8) in their comparable model, Role and Reference Grammar; see 
also their Table 4.1, p. 147. At the discourse level, “semantic” internal unrealized arguments 
may or may not evoke a particular discourse referent.  
Examples (2) and (3) respectively, illustrate the first two aspects of this three-way 
distinction. 
 
(1) a   John saw the “No Entry” sign. 
 b   The postman placed the packet in the tray. 
             c   The car hit the railing. 
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In the case of the verbs in (1), the syntactically expressed internal arguments apparently cannot 
be unrealized: 
 
(2)  a´  *John saw2. 
    b´  *The postman placed. 
    c´  *The car hit. 
 
Note however that, where the predicator see has its “understand” sense, where the internal 
argument is understood as a propositional content of some kind (a third-order entity), the latter 
may well be unrealized, given a suitable context: 
 
(2) a´´A[Garage mechanic]:  Your brake pads are completely worn.  I’ll have to replace  
them. 
                B [Motorist]:  I see ø.  How much will that cost? 
 
This shows that the possibility or obligatoriness of realizing a given argument is a function of 
the semantics of a given lexical predicate as well as of the argument concerned (cf. 
Pustejovsky, 1995), and not of its syntactic status qua lexical item. See also Levin & 
Rappaport Hovav (2005: 18) on this point.  
  However, the 3-place predicate place is somewhat different from the 2-place predicates 
see and hit, in that it may well occur in context without one of its “internal” arguments being 
syntactically instantiated. This “locative” A3 internal argument then becomes ‘tacit’, 
recoverable from the context of utterance of the clause involved.  In this particular case then, 
we see that the semantic and syntactic valencies of a predicate may diverge – its syntactic 
valency being reduced to 2, while its semantic valency remains at 3. But even transitive verbs 
like hit may occur in context with only their A1 (first argument) instantiated, as in this attested 
example from the genre of journalism: 
 
(2) c´´   [Context: article about a 1.3kg meteorite which crashed into a New Zealand  
        couple’s living room shortly before breakfast] 
        “…Even at that speed [several hundred metres per second] it would have been 
                                                
2 This is clearly highly language-specific, since the equivalent verb in other languages may well leave its internal argument 
unexpressed syntactically, even under a specific, anaphoric interpretation of the zero form. Huang (2000: 78) gives the 
following example from European Portuguese: 
 
 (i)   José sabe     que Maria  ø viu. 
       José  knows  that Maria     saw 
       ‘José knows that Maria saw (him)’ 
       (Example (2.130a) in Huang, 2000) 
 
In familiar spoken French, non-realization of the internal argument of the equivalent verb voir could not occur anaphorically 
in this tightly-integrated environment (within a complement clause). However, it could well occur as such in a syntactically 
less integrated context: 
 
(ii)     Pierre a   dit que  Jeanne serait        là  ce   soir,    mais j’ai        pas  
Pierre has said  that Jeanne would be  there  this evening  but  I have  NEG  
vu     ø. 
seen 
‘Pierre said that Jeanne would be here/there tonight, but I didn’t see (her)’ 
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        moving fast enough to kill on the spot and the Archers’ one-year-old grandson 
        had been playing in the room moments before it hit.” (The Guardian, 
14.06.04, p. 2) 
 
Note here that the inanimate pronoun it would not be appropriate as a substitute for the null 
complement of hit in this example (it would tend to be interpreted as referring back to ‘the 
room in which the Archers’ one-year-old grandson had been playing’).     
 
(3) a   Mike sawed, and Mildred pruned. 
  b   Mary is pregnant. 
      c   Hilda read, while Jim wrote.   
 
In (3), by contrast, one or more non-first argument(s) of the predicator have not been realized 
(these are the “cognate” or the highly expected arguments of the verb in each case): the object 
sawed (typically a log or plank) and the instrument of the sawing, prototypically ‘a saw’ in 
(3a), ‘the baby’ with which Mary is pregnant in (3b), and ‘reading matter’ and ‘written matter’ 
(the product of the act of writing) in (3c). The verbs in (3a) and (3c) are all “incremental-
object” verbs (see Van Hout, 1999). But it would be a mistake to believe that these predicates’ 
A2 in their transitive use has disappeared at the lexical-semantic level when they are not 
realized syntactically, since it is quite possible for the interlocutor to question this entity: …I 
wonder what Ron sawed/Mildred pruned? for (3a), and …I wonder what Hilda read/Jim 
wrote? in (3c) (cf. Fillmore’s, 1986 test).  
Clearly in these cases, the non-instantiation of the A2 has had the effect of turning an 
accomplishment predication (where all the predicates’ arguments are lexically instantiated) 
into an activity one (where their non-instantiated A2 arguments are construed as indeterminate 
or generic: see §3.1 below for definitions of these terms). It is by hypothesis the highly 
specific selection restriction imposed on the instantiation of this argument position which is 
responsible for transferring this semantic property to the non-instantiated argument positions3. 
This results in the understanding that, for example, “Ron sawed logs” and “Mildred pruned 
roses” in an utterance of (3a), and that “Hilda read books/magazines/newspapers” and “Jim 
wrote letters/his diary/articles” in one of (3c) (the context of utterance is clearly responsible 
for delimiting the specific understanding of these null A2’s in such instances).  In each case, 
though with the exception of the first internal argument in (3a), oddity would arise if this 
unexpressed argument were to be realized without modification of some kind or other:  
 
 (2) a´  ?Mike sawed the log with a saw. 
   b´  ?Mary is pregnant with a baby/child. 
       c´  ?Hilda read reading matter, while Jim wrote written matter.  
 
This would not be the case, however, if the cognate argument were modified in its syntactic 
realization (cf. Pustejovsky’s 1995: 63-7 notion of “shadow argument”). Clearly, such shadow 
“cognate” or highly expected arguments form part of the lexical-semantic structure of the 
predicates concerned, and as such correspond to what Mairal Usón & Faber (2002) call 
“internal variables” (cf. also Van Valin & LaPolla, 1997: 117-118) — aspects of the meaning 
                                                
3   Cf. Dik’s (1997a : §4.2.6) account of the operation of selection restrictions within standard FG. 
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of a predicate which characterize the general lexical class of predicates of which it is a 
member, and which do not need to be expressed syntactically.     
We may say that the first type of internal arguments represents part of the predicate’s 
syntactic as well as its semantic valency, while the second type only constitutes part of its 
semantic valency. On the discourse level, the latter may or may not evoke or retrieve a 
discourse referent.  The distinction between the two types of valency may be seen most clearly 
in the structure of passive and middle verbs, where in the former case, the prepositional agent 
phrase (…by NP) is most commonly considered to be an optional adjunct syntactically (i.e. it 
is not part of the verb’s syntactic valency), but its referent is nevertheless part of the semantic 
valency of the predicate at issue. In the case of middle verbs, the agent phrase is (usually) not 
realized syntactically, though an agent is nonetheless part of these verbs’ semantic valency (cf. 
Mauner et al., 2002).   
  
3. The semantic and discourse-referential status of implicit arguments 
 
 A further three-way distinction is needed within the category of implicit internal arguments 
itself, in terms of the semantic and discourse-referential properties and behavior of the zero 
expression: that is, amongst non-referential (generic or indeterminate), referential-(in)definite 
(discourse-new) and anaphoric (contextually definite) internal implicit arguments (cf. 
Fillmore, 1986, Groefsema, 1995, Lambrecht & Lemoine, to appear 2006, García Velasco & 
Portero Muñoz, 2002, Larjavaara, 2000, Berrendonner, 1995, Mejri & François, to appear 
2006, Noailly, 1998a, 1998b and others, for similar but not identical distinctions).   
 
3.1 Non-referential (generic or indeterminate) implicit arguments 
 
 In the first of these three uses, the non-realized A2 or A2 and A3 argument(s) of potentially 
transitive verbs, adjectives etc. may have a non-specific or generic value, in which case the 
identification of the intended referent is communicatively unimportant, the speaker not having 
any particular object in mind. This phenomenon is close to an “absolute” use of the predicate 
concerned, whereby it is virtually equivalent to an intransitive predicate, the focus being 
placed on the action, process or state evoked via that predicate as applied to the referent of the 
subject expression4.  However, the verb in question’s semantic valency will not have been 
affected by this phenomenon, as Noailly (1998a: 377) points out in the case of French. It is 
only in syntactic terms that we can say that such uses are intransitive. In general, such 
occurrences do not give rise to a discourse-referent at the level of discourse. What seems to 
happen here is that the predicate’s selection restriction (part of its core sense) is simply 
transferred to the unrealized non-first argument, so that the latter assumes these very general 
characteristics (“sawable objects - typically logs” for saw and “trees, shrubs and/or bushes” for 
prune in (3a), “reading matter” for read and “writing matter” for write in (3c), for example).  
Goldberg (2001: 512), like Lehrer (1970), also suggests an analysis in terms of 
semantic selection restrictions, though in relation to English causative verbs.  She contrasts the 
verbs recycle (where the object of the recycling is specifically ‘garbage’ of some kind) and 
break, where, similar to cut or hit, the object broken is only understood as being a rigid, 
                                                
4 Examples seen so far would be the cognate arguments in (2a) and (2c) in §2.1 above. See also Goldberg (2001) for further 
discussion in relation to English causative verbs.  
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breakable object. Hence, according to Goldberg, the semantic contribution of the Patient 
argument is too unpredictable for it to be unrealised syntactically: 
 
 (3)  a That man always recycles. 
  b *That man always breaks.  (Goldberg’s, 2001 examples (22a, b), p. 512) 
 
With regard to (3a) (a constructed example), I can vouch for its possibility of occurrence as an 
utterance-token, with the following attested example involving four otherwise transitive verbs 
with unrealized second arguments (here the indeterminate nature of the references in each case 
is clear): 
 
(3) a´   [Notice on individual dustbins on pavements in a street in Canterbury, UK:]  
  “Recycling is so easy when it’s collected from your doorstep.” 
 
As we will see below, the second argument of recycling (as in Goldberg’s example with the 
predicate in verbal form, in (3a)), is an “inherent” argument, part of the meaning of this 
predicate only; thus no discourse referent is evoked, and the pronoun it in the second clause of 
the example has the same, generic, stereotypical referential value as does this inherent 
argument.  Note further here that recycle is an activity predicate aspectually, whereas break is 
an accomplishment when intransitive, and a causative accomplishment when transitive, in 
Vendler’s (1967) typology of Aktionsart types. These categories will be important in what 
follows (see this section and section 4 in particular). 
 The restriction referred to above would explain the impossibility of the realisations in 
(1a´-c´), since none of the verbs see, place or hit places any specific semantic selection 
restriction on its non-first argument(s) – but see the possible use of hit in the definite past tense 
with a referential null complement in the attested example (2c´´). Note also that while the 
sentences in (2) designate atelic situations (activities – (2a,c) and a property (i.e. a state) – 
(2b)), those in (1) denote telic ones. As we shall be seeing in more detail below, when the host 
verb is construed atelically, the non-realisation of the relevant non-first argument(s) is 
generally possible. Examples already seen are those in (2) as well as the occurrence of the 
normally accomplishment verb kill in (2c´´), which is converted to an activity predicate via the 
non-specific predication in which it occurs, as well as via the fact that its second argument is 
syntactically null. However, with a telic interpretation (as in (1)), non-realisation is in 
principle only possible in English where the host predicate imposes a specific selection 
restriction on the relevant internal argument(s). 
This non-referential subtype, then, corresponds to Lambrecht & Lemoine’s (to appear, 
2006) type Indefinite Null Instantiation. The authors stress that the “unspecified” nature of the 
reference of the null complement in such cases is not a purely lexical-semantic matter, but is a 
function of its “pragmatic construal” in discourse. The examples and their analyses below 
would appear to confirm this view (see in particular the verbs in example (5) below). An 
example is given by Groefsema (1995, ex. (4a)) in terms of the verb to eat5: 
 
                                                
5 But see §4.1 below for an alternative analysis of this example. Groefsema prefixes this example with an asterisk, which I 
have replaced with the crosshatch (since the example is not ungrammatical qua sentence, but self-contradictory as an 
utterance). 
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 (4)   #John brought the sandwiches but Ann didn’t eat ø – she ate the cakes instead. 
 
In (4), the verb eat may be used intransitively, but with an A2 that is subject to a general 
selection restriction of the type <food>.  In this use, the second conjunct of (4) would mean 
that “Ann did not eat any unspecified food” (in other words, she didn’t eat anything at all, 
whence the incoherence of the integration of the content of the last clause of this fragment, 
which says that she ate some cakes). Thus there is no retrieval of the referent ‘the sandwiches 
which John brought’, and hence a restriction to just those foodstuffs. In fact, given the 
“activity-focus” interpretation of eat here, we may say, as do Koenig & Mauner (2000), that 
no real internal argument at all is involved here, the verb eat having its “absolute” sense as a 
property-attributing predicate. Koenig & Mauner (2000) would call the non-referring internal 
argument of eat in (4) an “a-definite”.  An “a-definite” is an implicit argument which does not 
evoke a discourse referent, since it is neither definite, nor indefinite, but partakes of both 
values simultaneously; all that such implicit arguments do is satisfy the argument position of 
the predicate which they “fill”6.  Van Valin & LaPolla (1997: 123) call such arguments 
“inherent arguments”, a notion which they define as follows: “…an argument which expresses 
an intrinsic facet of the meaning of the verb and does not refer specifically to any participants 
in the event denoted by the verb; it serves to characterise the nature of the action rather than to 
refer to any of the participants.” 
 An attested example is the following advertisement in The Sunday Times for a motor 
show, involving four otherwise transitive verbs with unrealised second arguments (here the 
indeterminate nature of the references in each case is clear): 
 
 (5)  “See, try, admire or buy at London’s Motor Show.” (Advertisement, The Sunday 
        Times, 9.10.83, p. 9) 
 
The types of things which the reader of the advertisement in (5) is enjoined to “see, try, admire 
or buy” (note the imperative mood of these predications, which favours non-realisation) are 
clearly new models of motor vehicles and their accessories, exhibited in the Motor Show to 
which the utterance is referring. We thus have a set of - fairly general, in all these instances - 
selection restrictions transferred by the senses of each of the predicates involved to their non-
instantiated A2,s, senses which are delimited to a denotation type via the context in which the 
text occurs - an advertisement for a Motor Show.  Such arguments would not receive a macro-
role in Van Valin & LaPolla’s (1997) Role and Reference Grammar model, no discourse 
referent being introduced in order to be the object of subsequent predications.  
 As Mejri & François (to appear, 2006) point out, it is necessary to distinguish between 
indeterminate (as I shall call this sub-type) and generic values of null complements. The type 
in (4a´) (“Recycling is so easy when it’s collected from your doorstep.”) could be argued to be 
generic, since the (initial) clause as a whole is generic: the tense is the (gnomic) present, and 
the predication attributes a property to an event type as opposed to token. Whereas in (5), the 
four predications are eventive, the conjuncts each being in the imperative mood, and the 
actions enjoined being located within a specific commercial event. The null complements thus 
all have an indeterminate, rather than generic value here.  In both cases, it is the event (token 
                                                
6 The authors’ key example is the short passive, where the implicit internal argument is interpreted as the unspecified agent of 
the result of the action denoted: (1a) A ship was sunk. 
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or type) denoted by the verbal predicate which is highlighted by the null complement 
realisation, its participants being backgrounded thereby. See also the use of kill in (2c´´) (“…it 
would have been moving fast enough to kill on the spot…”), whose null complement would 
appear to have an indeterminate (human-denoting) value here (“people, whoever they might 
be”).  
One possible test of whether a zero expression as null complement of a given predicate is 
interpreted as generic/indeterminate (“indefinite”, in Fillmore’s terminology) or referential 
(anaphoric, in this case: “definite” for Fillmore) is proposed by Fillmore (1986: 97): 
 
(6) a    He was eating ______ ; I wonder what he was eating. 
      b   They found out ______ ; # I wonder what they found out.  
 
That there is an internal argument here is indicated by the fact that it makes sense to ask a 
question in instances such as (6a): after all, with purely intransitive verbs (both syntactically 
and semantically), such as die, a question of this sort would be absurd (John died - *What did 
John die?). The indirect question in the second clause of (6a) is semantically appropriate, 
however, since the nature of the food being eaten, as evoked via the first clause, is unspecified 
and communicatively unimportant:  the argument is only “inherent”, in Van Valin & LaPolla’s 
(1997) terms, or “a-definite”, in those of Koenig & Mauner (2000). In the case of the predicate 
find out in (6b), on the other hand, the zero complement does have a contextually-identifiable 
(and thus ‘discourse-’) referent, which is presupposed to be known and highly accessible to the 
addressee at the point of occurrence. Another reflex of the distinction lies in the fact that 
intransitive eat in (6a) is an activity predicate which does not require any particular context for 
its occurrence; while find out in (6b) is an achievement predicate in terms of Aktionsart, which 
clearly does require a particular context for its occurrence to be felicitous (one in which the 
intended referent of the null complement is made salient in some way).  But the test illustrated 
in (6) does not enable us to distinguish between generic/indeterminate and discourse-new 
implicit arguments, as illustrated below in (7) and (8).   
 
3.2  Discourse-new referential implicit arguments 
 
Another value assumable by implicit internal arguments is that of evoking a discourse referent 
which may later be retrieved, under certain conditions, via an anaphor. This value is termed a 
“latent object” (objet latent) by Larjavaara (2000) (Larjavaara 2000:51 conflates under this 
term the discourse-new and the anaphoric use of such zero arguments; what is crucial here is 
that the zero form’s intended referent be identifiable7 by the addressee, or at least that it be 
treated as such by the speaker. Whether or not it is salient at the point of occurrence in the co-
text is immaterial).  This corresponds to both of Mejri & François’ (to appear, 2006) subtypes 
“latent-identifiable” and “latent-identifiable and salient”. It corresponds in part to Lambrecht 
& Lemoine’s (to appear, 2006) type Free Null Instantiation, where “the referent can be either 
                                                
7 “Identifiable” only after the clause has been processed, however, since this occurrence would be substitutable in context by 
an indefinite, but not a definite, NP (I am indebted to Nancy Hedberg for pointing this out). As such, this occurrence would 
correspond to the cognitive status “referential” in the Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski (1993: 276) “Givenness Hierarchy” (see 
§5.2 for further discussion), defined as follows: “the addressee must either retrieve an existing representation of the speaker’s 
intended referent or construct a new representation by the time the sentence has been processed.” 
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specific or non-specific, the choice of interpretation being left up to the hearer” (MS. p. 5). 
The first conjunct of (7) below provides an initial example: 
 
(7)   I wrote ø to you a week ago, you know, but you never answered ø! 
  
In (7), the context indicates that the verb write is being used in its “correspond” sense; the 
predicate at issue therefore has three arguments, the second of which is unrealized 
syntactically. This non-instantiated A2 argument (‘a letter sent by the speaker to his/her 
interlocutor a week before the time of utterance’) is clearly referential, owing to the definite 
past tense chosen here, and the reference to a specific event which occurred prior to the 
utterance of (7). It is equally clearly discourse-new, being an introductory reference (even 
though the intended addressee may already be aware of the existence of such a letter), the 
referent constituting discourse-new information in context. Unlike the “generic/indeterminate” 
values of null complements seen in §3.1, the “referential- (in)definite” use does introduce a 
discourse referent (and would clearly warrant the assignment of a “macro-role” in terms of 
RRG). See also the example given in (13a) in sub-section 4.1 below, where the zero 
complement would correspond to a definite, but not indefinite, NP. 
Other examples of discourse-new null complements can be found in deictic occurrences, 
where the referent is potentially available to the addressee from within the utterance context, 
but not yet salient (i.e. topic-worthy). Typically, such instances occur in imperative contexts, 
within a non-specific context), where the interlocutive relationship is highly constrained: 
 
(8)  Eat ø!/Watch ø!/Mind ø!/Smell ø!/Taste ø! 
 
In each such case, the interlocutor’s attention is being specifically drawn to the thing or event 
involved, which is available within the situational context.  As such, it is thereby made salient 
for both participants. 
 
3.3  Anaphoric (contextually-definite) implicit internal arguments 
 
A third possibility is where the implicit A2 argument is not only referential and identifiable, as 
in the case of the null A2 complement of wrote in (7) above, but anaphoric. The second non-
instantiated A2 argument in (7), the referent of the null complement of answered in the second 
conjunct, is contextually definite, in contrast, as it is construed as referring back anaphorically 
to the letter introduced by the null complement in the initial conjunct.  Fillmore’s (1986) test 
for “indefinite” (non-referential, of the type seen in §3.1 above) null complements would be 
clearly negative here: …#I wonder what you never answered (see also examples (2)a´´B) and 
(2c´´)). This subtype corresponds in part8 to Lambrecht & Lemoine’s (to appear, 2006) type 
Definite Null Instantiation.  
Given that I include under the heading “anaphora” exophoric uses of potentially 
anaphoric expressions9, I would subsume under this value such uses of zero complements - as 
in the case of labels on bottles of pharmaceutical products, instructions for use etc. of the type: 
                                                
8 I say “in part”, since Lambrecht & Lemoine make clear that their category “Definite Null Instantiation” covers not only 
anaphoric, but also discourse-new, identifiable referents of the zero complement. Thus, such zero complements would not be 
substitutable by an unaccented pronoun, but rather by a relevant definite full NP.  
9 See Cornish (1999: ch. 4) for arguments in favour of this move.  
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Take ø with precaution (label on bottle of medicinal pills); Break ø in an emergency 
(instruction displayed on a glass panel behind which is placed an alarm).  The host verbs in 
such examples are in the imperative mood, like the deictic examples in (8).  However, it is 
clear that the intended referent of the zeros in such ‘label’ cases is not only identifiable, but 
salient and (potentially) topical: the addressee’s attention is assumed, in such “caption-like” 
instances, to be already centred on the object on or under which the notice is placed.  Thus the 
implicit argument is contextually-definite, and the reference is anaphoric (cf. the infelicitous 
queries: #…I wonder what should be taken with precaution/#…I wonder what should be 
broken in an emergency, respectively).    
As a further example, let us give the second member of the minimal pair of examples 
presented by Groefsema (1995) (her (4b)): 
 
(9) The guide left but the tourists didn’t follow ø – they followed  the courier instead. 
 
In (9), unlike the use of eat illustrated in (4), the zero form with which the verb follow is 
constructed in the second conjunct may well retrieve the contextually definite referent ‘the 
guide who left’, since, according to Groefsema (1995), in the lexical-semantic structure of this 
verb there is a selection restriction which requires a particular occurrence of a thing (here it is 
an event) corresponding to a given type. Follow would thus be a verb allowing a definite (and 
not indefinite) null complement, in Fillmore’s terms.  Fillmore’s (1986) test given under (6) is 
again negative here, as with his example verb find out: The guide left but the tourists didn’t 
follow ___ ; # I wonder who they didn’t  follow.  
 
4. The anaphoric potential of null complements, event structure and predication 
 
4.1  Interpretative values of complement zeros vs. overt object pronouns 
 
Concentrating from now on essentially upon the contextually-definite, anaphoric function 
of null complements, we can say, first of all, on the basis of the discussion in sections 2 and 3, 
that this is possible in English under two main conditions: first, there must exist a specific 
selection restriction upon the non-first argument(s) subject to non realization in terms of 
syntax. The second condition is evidently that the null complement’s referent be contextually 
salient and topical, a condition generally holding on the existence of anaphora; however, in the 
case of English, this condition is only a necessary, and not a sufficient one, as example (10) 
clearly indicates.  
 
(10)   Martin liked the look of the pair of walking shoes displayed in the store window: 
he went and bought *ø/them without trying *ø/them on.  
 
Here, the verb buy is used in the definite past tense, and the reference is clearly to a specific 
occasion of buying something – a pair of walking shoes – and of not trying that something on. 
But even though this referent is contextually salient as well as topical, this is not sufficient to 
permit the non-instantiation of the internal argument of the two verbs concerned under an 
anaphoric (coreferential) reading10.  It would seem to be the non-specific nature of the 
                                                
10 See also the ill-formed examples of 2- or 3-place achievement or accomplishment verbs with null complements in (1) above 
– where the tense is also the definite past, and the intended referent of the null complement may also be contextually salient. 
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selection restriction associated with the lexical-semantic structure of these verbs which 
prevents this type of functioning. The verbs buy and try on seem to have only very general 
selection restrictions (respectively, <commodity> and <clothing>). In spontaneous spoken 
French, however, the equivalent verbs may well occur with a null complement, under an 
anaphoric interpretation: see the French equivalent of the final clause in (10): …Il est allé ø/les 
acheter sans ø/les essayer. In English, only an overt pronoun may occur as complement of the 
verbs in such a context.    
What now of the difference in behaviour of null complements and unaccented overt 
pronouns?  In this respect, Groefsema (1995: 156) gives a telling minimal pair, but which she 
does not further analyse. Here the null complement in (11a) is “indefinite” (though still 
anaphoric) and not contextually definite: 
 
(11) a   John picked up the glass of beer and drank ø. 
        b  John picked up the glass of beer and drank it. 
 
In (11a), what John is said to have drunk is some, not necessarily all, of the beer in the glass 
evoked via the initial conjunct (i.e. the null complement entails a partitive reading here). The 
zero is anaphoric, but the null instantation of this predicate’s A2 has had the effect of changing 
the accomplishment Aktionsart evident in (11b) with the pronoun into an activity predication. 
In (11b), by contrast, John is stated as having drunk all of the beer in the glass (the overt 
pronoun enabling the accomplishment event structure to be specified, and inducing a holistic 
interpretation).  The anaphoric, and not “indeterminate”, non-referential value of the zero in 
(11a) is determined by the fact that the two conjuncts of this example designate a sequence of 
two specific events (note the definite past tense borne by the verbs in each conjunct) which 
each form an integral part of a more global event. 
Groefsema’s analysis of the null complement evident in (11a) highlights the fact that 
the verb drink does not (in the absence of a syntactically-realized direct object) place any 
specific selection restriction upon its internal argument (technically, in terms of Jackendoff’s, 
1990 Lexical-Conceptual model), other than that it be a THING (type of entity) of the type 
“liquid” – but certainly not an “instance” of a THING (i.e. token or occurrence of a THING). 
However, the reader of (11a) will certainly understand the null complement of drank as 
referring to (a quantity of) the beer evoked in the initial conjunct, and not of any unspecified 
type of beverage.   
Lehrer (1970: 245) gives a similar minimal pair involving the verb drink, but the 
interpretation possibilities associated with the use of the null complement versus the pronoun 
are rather different:  
 
 (12) a  John drinks only gin, but I won’t drink11. 
        b John drinks only gin, but I won’t drink it.  (Lehrer, 1970: examples (67) and 
 (68), p. 245) 
 
For Lehrer (1970: 245), the interpretation of the null complement in (12a) is the generic one 
‘alcoholic beverage’, and not ‘gin’ as such. This is the default interpretation associated with 
                                                
11 Note that this utterance is not fully acceptable as it stands. A more natural rendering of the second conjunct would involve 
replacing the negative modal auxiliary won’t by the neutral don’t, expressing a more objective property of the subject referent, 
and adding the negative emphatic particle at all: …but I don’t drink at all. 
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the ‘absolute’ use of intransitive drink (the domain of ‘alcoholic drinks’ is set by the reference 
to “gin” in the initial conjunct). In (12a), unlike (11a), there is no (partitive) anaphoric 
interpretation available for the zero complement of drink, since each predication denotes an 
atemporal property (via the simple present tense in each conjunct and the lack of an article in 
the NP gin), the second property holding independently of the first. Thus the predication in the 
second conjunct of (12a) does not continue the situation established in the first, and so the null 
complement is not anaphoric in value (see Kleiber, 1994: ch. 3). We thus have the generic 
value, delimited via the reference to ‘gin’ in the initial conjunct to ‘alcoholic beverages’, 
which we saw in §3.1 (see also example (3a´) above). In contrast, in (12b) the definite pronoun 
is anaphoric, and refers to the type of alcoholic beverage mentioned in the initial conjunct, 
namely ‘gin’.  
The situation represented by (11) seems somewhat different, then, from the ostensibly 
identical example (4) involving the verb eat (also one of Groefsema’s examples), where it was 
claimed that the zero complement of the latter verb is purely non-referential in value (as in 
Lehrer’s example (12a) above), and could not retrieve the referent ‘the sandwiches’ evoked in 
the initial conjunct of (4).  Fillmore’s (1986) test of non-specificity would be negative in the 
case of (11a) (#…but I wonder what he drank). It would seem, from examination of just these 
two transitive/intransitive verbs, that Lambrecht & Lemoine’s (to appear, 2006) intermediate 
category “Free Null Instantiation” would be relevant as a characterization of their potential 
uses – either a specific, anaphoric, or a non-specific, quasi-generic interpretation being 
possible for the complements of such verbs.  
I would argue that this systematic difference in interpretation arises because of the fact 
that overt pronouns are nominals which, because of their inherent definiteness and (potential, 
at least) referentiality, change the Aktionsart of the verb whose second argument they 
instantiate, from an atelic activity into a telic accomplishment. Thus with definite complement 
pronouns, the emphasis is no longer on the activity of drinking (or eating), but on the nature of 
the thing drunk (or eaten).  But this may also be the case even with “incremental-object” verbs 
like eat and drink, whose Patient argument is understood to be progressively affected by the 
process involved, even when their second argument is unexpressed syntactically. Compare 
(13a) and (13b) in this respect12: 
 
 (13)  a  Mary ate ø at noon.  
          b  The waiter served the main course. Mary ate ø hungrily. 
 
In both (13a) and (13b), the tense is the definite past, and the reference is to a specific event 
which occurred prior to the act of utterance.  The null instantiation of the A2 in (13a) induces 
the basic, characteristic activity interpretation of the verb13, but the presence of the 
contextualising PP at noon overlays this reading with the culture-specific stereotype ‘midday 
meal’ as the frame in which the event denoted is to be set, so that the predication as a whole is 
telic, and not atelic via non-instantiation of the A2. This is clearly a referential instance, but a 
“discourse-new” one rather than an anaphoric, context-bound instance. It is a frame-based 
                                                
12  I am indebted to the anonymous external reviewer for example (13a) and its relevance to the point at issue here.  
13  See Van Valin & LaPolla (1997: 112) for arguments that verbs of consumption such as eat and drink are basically activity 
verbs in terms of Aktionsart, which may be used transitively as accomplishment predicates. See also Mittwoch (1982) on the 
difference in Aktionsart between eat and eat something.  
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occurrence, trading on the cultural knowledge that meals (in most Western societies) normally 
take place at or around noon every day.  
But in (13b), the presence of the manner adverb hungrily highlights the basic activity 
sense corresponding to the predicate’s inherent value (since it directly modifies the activity 
subeventual structure underlying this predicate lexical-semantically). There is no implicature 
available such that Mary actually finished eating the main course which she has been served. 
Thus the zero has the indeterminate, non-referential value which we saw in the case of the 
verbs in (3) and (5).  If we apply Fillmore’s “I wonder what X V-ed” test, it is positive in (13b) 
(“I wonder what Mary ate”), but negative in (13a) (with the predicted response “#She ate a 
midday meal”; however, with the type of response expected and normal for the same query on 
(13b) – e.g. “….chicken and noodles” –, it is positive). The bounded/non-bounded adverbial 
tests also discriminate the two occurrences: for (13a) Mary ate ø at noon ?#for ages/in an 
hour; and for (13b) Mary ate ø hungrily for ages/#in an hour . 
With hindsight, it appears that what prevented the null complement of eat in (4) from 
functioning anaphorically was the fact that it occurred in the scope of the negation, preceded 
by the expectation-denying conjunction but. If we remove these two elements, the anaphoric 
interpretation is not only possible, but highly expected: 
 
 (4´)  John brought the sandwiches, and Ann ate hungrily. 
 
Here, the same “partitive” interpretation seems to come to the fore as in the case of the null 
complement of drank in (11a): that is, we understand in (4´) that WHAT Ann ate were the 
sandwiches which John brought, but that she didn’t necessarily eat all of the sandwiches that 
he brought - only some of them.  This seems to contradict Groefsema’s (1995) prediction here, 
as well as an identical one made for this verb by Van Valin & LaPolla (1997: 122) using a 
very similar example.  
However, as in the case of the use of the overt pronoun it in (11b), if we replace the 
zero complement in (4´) by the overt pronoun them, then the same holistic interpretation as in 
(11b) naturally presents itself. The situation is thus somewhat more subtle than Groefsema 
(1995) implies, since it clearly involves a complex interaction between lexical-semantics, 
syntactic realization (or non-realization, as the case may be) and discourse function14.   
 
4.2  The roles of Aktionsart and event structure: “content” vs. “(event-) structural” arguments 
 
Rappaport Hovav & Levin (1998: 104ff.) and Brisson (1994) also claim that it is the aspectual 
structure of the verbal predicates concerned which determines whether or not their A2 
argument may be left unrealized: however, it is not the static, inherent lexical-semantics of 
each individual verb which is relevant here, but the compositional semantics of the predicative 
unit as a whole (verb + possible extra adverbial element) – see also Ritter & Thomas Rosen 
(1998) and Van Hout (1999), as well as the contrast between (13a) and (13b) above.  
Both Brisson and Rappaport Hovav & Levin claim that the non-realization of internal 
arguments is only possible when the argument at issue is a “content”, and not a “structural” 
one. The distinction involves that between the aspectual or “event structure” of the sentence as 
a whole, where the participants involved are “structural participants”, and the lexically-
                                                
14 Cf. also Goldberg (2001).  
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specific content of the predicate which “heads” that structure.  This predicate brings with it a 
certain array of arguments in terms of its meaning: these are the “content” arguments. Thus 
there may be a discrepancy between the two types of structure. Brisson argues that (“activity”) 
verbs of the type illustrated by sweep (plough, pack, dust, vacuum, clean, mow, rake…) may 
occur with either a durative or a bounded time adverbial15, whether with or without a 
syntactically-realized object NP, and whether this NP is definite or indefinite. This would give 
the predicate ‘sweep’ (as well as the others in its class) the “content” structure sweep (x,y) but 
the event structure ‘activity (x)’. From Brisson’s account, one can infer that the ‘y’ argument 
in the content structure is more or less totally determined by the meaning of this predicate 
(stereotypically, a ‘floor’ of some kind) – an “inherent” or “a-definite” argument, then; 
whereas, given that this verb is basically an activity predicate (as indicated by the various tests 
applied to it), there would be no second, A2 argument at this event-structural level at all (in 
Van Valin & LaPolla’s 1997 terminology, the predicate’s content A2  argument would not 
correspond to a “macro-role”; the verb in question would thus be “M-intransitive”, bearing 
only one macro-role argument).   
Now, given that this is the case, the sole A2 “content” argument, not being a 
“structural” one, need not be realized syntactically – so long as its essential content is 
contextually recoverable. This is the case with verbs of the type represented by sweep, where 
general knowledge tells us that it is typically ‘floors’ that are swept (see also plough  
‘fields’, pack  ‘suitcases’, dust  ‘furniture’, vacuum  ‘carpets’, clean  ‘artefacts’, mow 
 ‘lawns’, rake  ‘leaves’, etc.). This general class of predicates is characterized by 
Rappaport Hovav & Levin (1998: 99) as “verbs of surface contact through motion”.  The 
situation described here would seem to characterize the first type of non-realization of non-
first arguments seen above in §3.1 (the non-referential generic/indeterminate argument type).  
On the other hand, where a given predicate has a causative accomplishment or 
achievement interpretation, there is necessarily a binary event structure involved, consisting of 
a causing event (an activity) and a resulting state. Thus there are inevitably two structural 
arguments, both of which must be realized syntactically, according to these authors. This 
would explain then why such predicates (for example, English break, as we have seen) cannot 
leave their A2 argument unrealized. Break is an “externally-caused change of state verb”, 
according to Rappaport Hovav & Levin (1998: 99). The content structure of break would then 
be break (x,y), and its event structure ‘activity (x) CAUSE [BECOME broken y]’, where 
broken represents both the essential content of the predicate ‘break’ and its status as ‘resulting 
state’ of the macro-event involved here16. See Van Valin & LaPolla’s (1997: 107) 
representation of the Aktionsart structure of causative break in their example (3.24).  It can be 
argued that the intransitive, inchoative use of break (as in The vase broke) is more basic, and 
that the transitive-causative use is derived from it by rule. I have attempted to formalize these 
two types of structure under (14a and b) below, drawing inspiration from the notation system 
used in Van Valin & LaPolla (1997)17. 
 
                                                
15  However, my feeling is that examples like Brisson’s (unstarred) (9b) (p. 91) Jack swept in an hour are not fully acceptable. 
One of the editors of this volume, Nancy Hedberg (p.c.), indicated agreement with this judgement.  
16 I have inserted the abstract operators CAUSE and BECOME here, as well as the square brackets, which Brisson does not 
do; indeed, she does not represent the structure of break in her article. 
17  The segment in parenthesis following ‘¬ intact’ (y)’ is intended to capture the selection restriction imposed on its single 
argument by the meaning of this predicate. For the inchoative ‘activity’ or ‘process’ value, the segment preceding the operator 
BECOME  in (19b) would not be instantiated. 
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 (14) a  “Content structure” of core sense of break, after Brisson (1994) and 
  Rappaport Hovav & Levin (1998): 
 
        BECOME ¬ intact’ (y) ((partially_)rigid_object, y) 
 
b  “Event  structure” of break, after Brisson (1994) and Rappaport Hovav & 
Levin (1998): 
 
     [[activity (x)] CAUSE [BECOME ¬ intact’ (y) ((partially_)rigid_object, y)]]   
 
Brisson’s (1994: 97) two licensing conditions on the possibility of unexpressed objects are 
given below: 
  
 (15) a   Grammatical licensing condition: structure arguments must be expressed.  
  (Brisson, 1994: (24)) 
b  Contextual licensing condition: the unexpressed object must be understood. 
(Brisson, 1994: (25)) 
   
 Rappaport Hovav & Levin (1998) formalise and further develop Brisson’s essential 
insights. They propose two well-formedness conditions on the syntactic realization of event 
structures, as follows: 
 
(16) Subevent Identification Condition 
Each subevent in the event structure must be identified by a lexical head (e.g. a 
V, A or P) in the syntax. (Rappaport Hovav & Levin, 1998: 112) 
 
 (17) Argument Realization Condition 
a. There must be an argument XP in the syntax for each structure participant 
in the event structure. 
b. Each argument XP in the syntax must be associated with an identified 
subevent in the event structure.  (Rappaport Hovav & Levin, 1998: 113) 
 
Condition (17a) makes more precise Brisson’s (1994) “Grammatical licensing condition” 
given under (15a) above; while Condition (17b) ensures that all argument expressions in the 
syntactic realization be relatable to a predicate corresponding to an identifiable subevent in the 
event structure associated with the sentence.  Condition (16) completes the picture, in that it 
ensures that each predicate marking a subevent in the event structure be relatable to a relevant 
lexical head.  
 However, it would seem that these conditions are much too rigid and absolute: they do 
not take enough account of the surrounding co-text or context of occurrence of the verbal 
predicates at issue here – i.e. of the way in which these predicates are actually used. If we take 
the (causative accomplishment) verbal predicate break as a typical verb having a binary event 
structure, with two content and two structural arguments, the prediction is that non-realization 
of the A2 argument is excluded – as we have seen.  In the case of the non-referential generic or 
indeterminate use of the verb, of course, the authors could claim that what we have is an 
activity, such that there is no longer a second structural argument since the binary event 
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structure is no longer available.  This could occur in the following kind of situation: imagine a 
warehouse full of trestle tables on which are piled substandard mass-produced cups, plates and 
saucers etc., all containing imperfections of one kind or another. Members of the public are 
invited to break these items into pieces, so that they can more easily be recycled. On the 
entrance to the warehouse is pinned a large notice, with the words:  
 
(18)  Break ø to your heart’s content!   
 
Clearly, this would correspond to the indeterminate, “absolute” use of transitive verbs with 
unrealized complements that we saw in §3.1, with the context-of-utterance delimiting the type 
of things to be broken as items of reject crockery on the tables in the warehouse. As already 
noted, this use would not constitute a counter-example to Brisson’s and Rappaport Hovav & 
Levin’s constraints (since in this usage, break and similar verbs would be activity and no 
longer achievement or accomplishment predicates; as such, they would be only unary event 
(i.e. activity) predicates). But there are two other possibilities with break. The first is the 
possible deictic use which we briefly saw in §3.2, where the null complement of break has a 
referent available via the utterance situation. As an example, consider again the “reject” 
crockery situation evoked a moment ago. Imagine a situation where a member of the public 
has entered the warehouse and has been merrily smashing plates, cups and saucers for the last 
20 minutes. Suddenly, he comes upon a large bowl with an attractive design, which doesn’t 
seem to him to be in too poor a condition. As he holds it up to examine it, the attendant walks 
towards him and says:  
 
 (19)  Come on now, break ø! They’ve all got to go, you know!   
 
Here, the referent is clearly present, both at the semantic and the discourse-representational 
levels – and yet the second “structural” argument is syntactically null, contrary to conditions 
(15a) and (17a).  I believe (19) corresponds to a deictic and not purely anaphoric use of the 
null complement, since the addressee is tacitly querying the status of the intended referent 
(thus it consists in introducing the referent qua “non-breakworthy” item of crockery in this 
context).  If an overt pronoun were to be used in place of the zero complement here, I believe 
it would be the demonstrative pronoun that rather than the (purely anaphoric) 3rd person 
pronoun it (thus it consists in introducing the referent qua “non-breakworthy” item of crockery 
in this context). This is the essential function of deixis, under my conception (see Cornish, 
1999: §2.3 and Ch. 4). Granted, there are “extenuating” circumstances here, independently 
motivating the null complement of break, since this type of occurrence is restricted to the type 
of highly modalized context represented by the imperative mood in (19).  
But there is a second type of counterexample to these stipulations, falling within the 
third of the three cases outlined in section 3 (§3.3).  This is the “exophoric” use of predicates 
like break, which I claimed come under the anaphoric, context-bound use (as in the notice 
Break ø in an emergency displayed above a glass panel covering an alarm handle). Here too 
there is an argument at the lexical-semantic level as well as a discourse-referent at the level of 
discourse. Again, the possibility of such occurrences is a counterexample to stipulations (15a) 
and (17a).  
In all three types of example involving break with a null complement, the clause is in 
the imperative mood. This is no accident, in fact. What this mood induces (contrary to the 
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declarative mood, in particular) is a focussing of attention on the object of the command – the 
speech-act type typically correlating with the imperative form. This serves, then, to enhance 
psychologically, i.e. to ‘profile’, the entity at issue, and thus to allow it to be unrealized 
syntactically. Though the mood is not imperative in examples like (20) below (suggested to 
me by one of the editors of this volume, Nancy Hedberg), (causative) accomplishment verbs 
like cut would nevertheless appear to allow their A2 to be unrealized syntactically, here with a 
context-bound, partitive anaphoric interpretation. 
 
(20) Mary helped me make paper dolls.  She colored and I cut. 
 
As Nancy Hedberg (p.c.) points out, the second sentence here clearly denotes a (complex)  
activity - but as such, of course, it would not be a counterexample to Brisson’s and Rappaport 
Hovav & Levin’s conditions on syntactic non-realization: the referent of the null complements 
of the two verbs is contextually recoverable (‘(parts of) the paper out of which Mary and the 
speaker are making paper dolls’) – see Brisson’s (1994) second condition (15b) above. The 
example would appear to be parallel to (11a), since the event structure is an activity one, and 
the event denoted in the second clause continues (or is an exemplification of) that evoked by 
the first; the zero complements involved are thus identity-of-sense anaphors, retrieving parts of 
the paper used to make the paper dolls. So although the verb’s two content arguments are 
present, in terms of the event structure of the clause as a whole the predicates at issue are 
unary (“M-intransitive”, in Van Valin & LaPolla’s 1997 terms, the second argument not 
corresponding to a “macro-role”), and conditions (15a) and (17a) are satisfied.  
 
5. Taking stock: the role of the host predication in the licensing of null complements  
 
Let us try now to assess the situation, and arrive at a set of principles enabling us to predict 
both whether a transitive predicate’s second or second and third argument(s) may be 
unrealized syntactically, and if so what will be their type of interpretation. Clearly, the 
occurrence of null complements in English needs to be licensed (we have already seen that the 
principles lying behind this licensing in the case of English are stricter than in that of 
spontaneous spoken French): for it is clearly not just any transitive verb, in any type of 
context, which may leave its A2, or A2 and A3, unrealized syntactically.  More precisely, there 
are two main questions to be addressed here: 
 
1) Under what circumstances may a predicate’s A2, or A2 and A3, be unrealized syntactically? 
2) What determines whether these unrealized arguments will receive a non-referential (generic or 
indeterminate) interpretation, or a referential  discourse-new reading, or an anaphoric one? 
 
Clearly, these questions are linked. Thus, an answer to question 2 will enable us to provide an 
answer to question 1. Let’s take question 1 first, but taking into account considerations relating 
to question 2.  
 
5.1 Aktionsart, event structure and selection restrictions 
 
First of all, it is clear that it is easier for a null complement to occur with an otherwise 
syntactically-transitive predicate in English when it can be interpreted non-referentially - 
“generically” or “indeterminately” (the so-called “absolute” use of transitive predicates) - than 
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when it is to be understood referentially (in either the discourse-new or anaphoric use). This is 
evident from a comparison between (5) and (10), reproduced below for convenience. 
 
(5)  “See, try, admire or buy at London’s Motor Show.”  
  (10)  Martin liked the look of the pair of walking shoes displayed in the store window: 
    he went and bought *ø/them without trying *ø/them on. 
 
In (5), the transitive verbs used “absolutely” occur within an atelic utterance, where the 
verbs are in the (imperfective) present tense. The predications are thus all atelic, and the 
implicit arguments are understood in terms of the selection restrictions of the predicates at 
issue, a denotation which as we have seen is delimited by the context of utterance of the clause 
concerned. No discourse referent is evoked. We may say then that, in principle, any 
syntactically transitive verb, when occurring in a non-perfective tense-aspect within an atelic 
or generic clause (or one which in context can be interpreted as atelic or generic), may allow 
its non-first argument(s) to be unrealized syntactically – but only insofar as there exists a 
socio-cultural stereotype which can license such a conceptual category. One test of the 
existence of such an argument type is the naturalness of an indirect question posed regarding 
the nature of this argument (cf. …I wonder what X V-ed/-s). If in the context of the utterance 
containing the null complement it is natural to pose such a question, then first, there must be 
an argument of some kind; and second, the argument in question is either generic (non-
specific) or indeterminate in reference. In both such cases, it makes sense to query this entity, 
precisely because it is indeterminate, or non-specific. In neither of the other two types of value 
is it natural to question the implicit argument.  
In example (10), by contrast, the verb buy appears in the simple past tense in a 
predication which designates a specific occurrence of an action. As we have seen, even though 
the intended referent is contextually identifiable and salient and topical at the point of 
occurrence, the complement of buy cannot be null under this construal. We have ascribed this 
impossibility to the lack of a specific selection restriction imposed on this argument position 
by the lexical-semantics of this predicate (one can “buy” all sorts of physical objects, 
conceived as “commodities” of one kind or another).   
On the other hand, where a transitive predicate’s “internal” selection restrictions are 
specific, this, in conjunction with the context-boundness (and saliency, when an anaphoric 
occurrence is at issue) of the intended referent, may be sufficient for the null complement to 
occur. This is illustrated in example (7) (I wrote to you a week ago, you know…) where the 
predicate write (an accomplishment predicate) in the context of an exchange of 
correspondence between speaker and addressee, imposes a sufficiently specific selection 
restriction upon the A2 argument for the referent to be identifiable in context (in the sense 
specified in note 7). Write, like drink, is an ‘incremental-object’ verb (cf. van Hout, 1999), 
whereby the existence of the thing(s) written (or drunk) increases in proportion to the time 
over which these predicates obtain.  
The interaction between the intrinsic aspectual properties of host predicates, on the one 
hand, and the event-structure of the containing clause as a whole (together with aspects of the 
context of utterance, including the availability of culturally-specific stereotypes) would seem 
to operate as follows. Aspectually, activity verbs (including incremental-object predicates) 
may occur with a null complement bearing a referential value when the co(n)text is such as to 
induce a specific, time-bound event. This is the case in (13a), where the temporal-locative 
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adverb at noon, coupled with the choice of the definite past tense, induces a referential 
construal of the null complement of ate, thereby introducing the discourse-new referent 
‘Mary’s midday meal’ into the discourse. Ate is still an activity predicate, but the predication 
as a whole takes on an accomplishment aspectual value, as when this verb’s second argument 
is lexically instantiated via a definite referential NP.  
Conversely, state, accomplishment and achievement verbs involving direct contact 
(physical, communicational, visual or mental) entail the immediate presence of the entity 
involved as a whole. Where the verb at issue is not one of consumption or durative creation, 
there is no gradual, progressive application of the predicate to the entity, or resulting in the 
appearance or disappearance of the entity. Thus in the absence of relevant context, there is no 
“activity” induced via the non-realization of these predicates’ A2.  Hence, the expected value 
of the null complement in these cases is in terms of one of the two referential (discourse-new 
or anaphoric) interpretations. Yet, as with activity predicates, the co(n)text may induce an 
opposite aspectual value (here, an activity reading), and thus assign the null complement the 
indeterminate, non-referential value (see examples (5), (18) and (20)).  Given contexts may 
well sanction occurrences of such predicates where their unexpressed complement has a 
referential value, in situations where they have two event-structure arguments (see the 
occurrence of hit in (2c´´) and of break in (19)).   
This is a clear violation of constraints of the type in (15a) and (17a) – but the works in 
which these constraints were formulated were based exclusively on invented, context-free 
examples, and did not take account of actual, attested data. In the case of incremental-object 
and activity verbs, there is a preference in terms of aspectual predicate type for either of the 
two non-referential (generic or indeterminate) values of the null complement; and in that of 
state, accomplishment and achievement verbs, there is a preference in terms of one of the two 
referential values for these complements – though in English, there must be a selectionally- or 
contextually-induced denotation type made available for this to be possible (cf. hit as used in 
(2c´´) in contrast to buy in (10)). But the opposite values may be induced via contextual 
triggers – features of the co-text or the context (or both), as well as the accessibility of given 
cultural stereotypes.  
 
5.2  Referential pragmatics: cognitive status, the Givenness Hierarchy, and one neo-Gricean 
account of anaphoric complement zeros vs. overt object pronouns 
  
As far as the pragmatics of zero forms is concerned, these are said by linguists such as Givón 
and Ariel to be extremely high accessibility markers.  Indeed, they figure at the extreme “High 
Accessibility” pole of Ariel’s (2001: 31, item (2)) Accessibility Marking Scale, where each 
referential expression-type is assigned a degree of accessibility relative to the status of its 
intended referent in the addressee’s memory, as assumed by the speaker at any given point in a 
discourse. Zero forms do not figure at all in Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski’s (1993; 2000) 
“Givenness Hierarchy”, though as Nancy Hedberg (p.c.) points out, in their (1993) article, 
these authors did include zero NPs on the Givenness Hierarchies which they postulated for 
Spanish, Chinese, Japanese and Russian, claiming that their referents are of necessity in focus.  
This is no doubt the case with the null complements in English and French which have 
the third of the three values isolated in this chapter (i.e. the context-bound, anaphoric 
function), and this was no doubt also what Ariel had in mind in placing zero forms on her 
Accessibility Marking Scale (however, Ariel predominantly illustrates and discusses subject 
      20             
zero forms, to the exclusion of complement ones). The first type isolated above (the non-
referential “inherent argument” type, in Van Valin & LaPolla’s, 1997 terms – see sub-section 
3.1 above) would of course not be relevant here, since it is bound up with the predicating 
ability of the verb in question, and has no referential force.  
However, the second type, depending on whether it is construed as hearer-new or 
hearer-old (a frame-based value), would not necessarily encode high accessibility: for the 
“hearer-new” variant, the intended referent is relatively inaccessible, since it is being 
introduced brand-new into the discourse; and for the “hearer-old” variant, the referent is 
midway accessible, being ‘expected” in terms of the knowledge frame currently being evoked, 
but nevertheless new in terms of the current discourse (i.e. its discourse-pragmatic value 
would be “hearer-old” (in terms of “inferrable”) but “discourse-new”): see Prince (1992) for 
an analysis of what she calls “inferrables” in these terms. As Lambrecht & Lemoine (to 
appear, 2006) note, null complements bearing this value cannot be replaced by unaccented 
pronouns, showing their status as somewhat less than “high” accessibility markers.  
  If we consider the Givenness Hierarchy solely in terms of the scale of cognitive 
statuses it recognizes, it would seem that the three interpretation types we have isolated for 
null complements in English range over the following positions: the polar ones for the 
anaphoric subtype (“in-focus”) and the non-referential one (“type identifiable”), with the 
‘discourse-new’ subtype ranging over the three intermediate statuses “familiar” or “uniquely 
identifiable” (for the ‘hearer-old’ variant) and “referential” (for the ‘brand-new’ one): 
 
 (21) in focus > activated  > familiar > uniquely identifiable  > referential  > type 
identifiable  (Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski, 1993: 275)  
  
In the case of the anaphoric subtype, the implicit argument’s “in-focus” status would 
seem unproblematic; in that of the non-referential one, given that the argument concerned is 
only an “inherent” one, and as such part of the characterisation of the essential meaning of the 
host predicate, it is analogous to the lexical component of an indefinite NP introduced by the 
indefinite article, as specified by the least restrictive cognitive status on the GH, namely “type-
identifiable”: the addressee is assumed by the speaker only to have access to the conventional 
sense of the head noun of an indefinite article + N sequence, just as in the case of the non-
referential null complement subtype, whose very raison d’être is to highlight the essential 
semantic content of the predicate whose second argument it represents, qua lexical item. There 
is a precedent within the GH itself for a given form type to occur at more than one position on 
the Hierarchy with different semantic-pragmatic values: namely, the proximal demonstrative 
determiner this, which occurs both under the status “activated” and under that of “referential” 
(in its referent-introducing use), statuses which are also not adjacent in the Givenness 
Hierarchy. Thus the cognitive statuses which may be signalled by null complements in English 
include all but one of the six positions recognized by the GH. 
Let us look now at Levinson’s (2000) neo-Gricean account in terms of referential 
“minimization” (zero forms could not be more “minimal” in this respect!). I will mainly be 
considering the context-bound, anaphoric value of the A2 or A2 and A3 arguments here (i.e. the 
referential value corresponding to the highest degree of accessibility of the four subtypes).  Let 
us consider a range of examples – some of which have already been presented.  
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(22) a “…and the Archers’ one-year-old grandson had been 
   playing in the room moments before it hit ø.” (ex. (2c´´)) 
  b  “…always lock your car and never leave anything valuable inside ø.”  
   (The Radio Times, section on “Crime”, p 114) 
  c Come on now, break ø! They’ve all got to go, you know! (ex. (19)) 
       d [At the theatre: A is seated next to B, who is placed right behind a tall 
   spectator in the seat in front] 
   A to B: Can you see ø?  
       e  “Care and Cleaning 
 (…) Refer to instructions below ø for cleaning the ‘Cookclean’ 
removable side panels (if fitted)… ” (Belling cooker installation and 
user instructions leaflet) 
f “Glass Lid (Glass) 
(…) Stubborn stains can be removed with a cream, paste or liquid 
cleaner, or by gently rubbing ø with liberally soaped, very fine steel 
wool pads….”  (Continuation of (22e)) 
g “…Polish ø with a clean dry or kitchen roll…”  (Continuation of (22f))  
 
The zero complement in (22a) refers to ‘the Archers’ house’, the one in (22b) to ‘the reader’s 
car’, in (22c) it refers to ‘the bowl with an attractive design which the hearer is examining’, in 
(22d), to ‘the stage in the theatre in which A and B are seated’ (this is an instance of the 
discourse-new referential subtype), in (22e) to ‘the occurrence of the null form in question’, in 
(22f) to ‘those stubborn stains which may still be on the glass lid of the cooker’, and in (22g) 
to ‘the glass lid of the cooker’.   
 In (22a), as we have seen, the unaccented pronoun it would have been possible, but 
with a potential shift in reference; in (22b), it would have been possible in place of the zero, 
with the same referential value; in (22c), it or that would clearly have been possible substitutes 
for the null complement; in (22d), it would have been odd as a replacement for the zero form; 
in (22e), it could not have occurred instead of the zero, since this is a textual-deictic use: only 
the proximal demonstrative pronoun this would have been an appropriate substitute here; in 
(22f), the plural pronoun them could have replaced the zero, with the same referent; but in 
(22g) them could not have occurred instead of the zero, since the predicative part of the 
anaphoric clause would have predicated an incoherent state of affairs of its referent ‘the 
stubborn stains which may get stuck to the cooker’s glass lid’: for the entity retrieved by the 
pronoun would be something which would hardly be likely to be “polished”! Only the 
pronoun it would target the intended referent of the zero, namely ‘the cooker’s glass lid’, the 
topic of this discourse segment.   
 The host predicators in (22) have the following aspectual properties: hit is an 
achievement predicate, inside is a state one, break a transition predicate (in its transitive 
occurrence in (22c), it is a causative-accomplishment predicate), see is a state predicate18, 
below is also a state predicate, rub is an activity predicate, and polish is likewise an activity 
predicate (more specifically, an “incremental-object” predicate). 
                                                
18 Note here that A’s question does not bear on the visual capacity of the addressee as such (see is not a pure intransitive 
predicate here), but pertains to whether or not B has a view of the stage which both interlocutors are facing. 
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 Now, Levinson (2000: 285) proposes what he calls “The general anaphora pattern” 
whereby zero forms (“NP-gaps”) used in positions where overt pronouns could also have been 
used, are more likely to implicate local coreference in conformity with his “I(nformativity)-
principle”, while pronouns occurring in place of a possible zero will “M(anner)-implicate” 
non-coreference. In turn, a pronoun used in place of an otherwise possible lexical NP (e.g. a 
definite NP) will I-implicate coreference, while the reverse pattern will M-implicate non-
coreference.  The “general anaphora pattern” is given as (26) in chapter 4:  
 
(23) The general anaphora pattern 
 Lexical NP >  pronoun  > NP-gap 
       M-implicates noncoreference 
   I-implicates coreference 
(Levinson, 2000: (26), p. 285)    
  
According to the I-principle (Levinson, 2000: (39), pp. 114-115), speakers tend to provide the 
minimum amount of information needed, consistent with the general direction of the 
exchange, while their addressees are supposed to infer from each utterance a more specific, 
more fully informative interpretation. As for the M-principle (Levinson, 2000: (69), pp. 136-
7), this basically says that the use of a marked expression in place of an otherwise possible 
unmarked one which would have I-implicated the corresponding normal, stereotypical 
situation, tends to signal the speaker’s intention to convey a marked interpretation.  
However, in the seven examples of zero complement anaphora or deixis in (22), only 
(22a) would seem to conform to Levinson’s “general anaphora pattern”, as far as the second 
and third positions on the scale are concerned19: for the overt pronoun it, a “marked” form in 
relation to the possible unmarked zero, would not have had the same referent. However, the 
way the scale is said to operate in relation to this example is not fully clear here, since it 
would have had a locally coreferent interpretation (with ‘the room in which the Archers’ one-
year old grandson had been playing minutes earlier’), the zero complement of hit referring 
more globally to ‘the Archers’ house’. In (22b), (22c), (22f) and (22g), the interpretation of 
tokens of the pronoun it (or them in the case of (22f)) in place of the zero would be the 
opposite of the prediction from (23): namely, it and the zero would have the same strict 
anaphoric or “exophoric” interpretation (in (22c)), respectively, maintaining the reference to 
the reader’s car in (22b), to the problematic entity being held up for examination by the 
addressee (i.e. ‘the bowl’) in (22c), to the stubborn stains which may remain on the cooker’s 
                                                
19 There are various independent co-textual and contextual factors listed by Huang (2000) and Blackwell (1998: 613-614, item 
(30)); (2001: 939, item (10d)) which are claimed to neutralise the operation of the M-principle in particular. For example, in 
(22b), the conjoined parallel imperative construction makes a coreferential interpretation of the zero complement in the 
second conjunct highly preferred. A similar explanation for the locally coreferent interpretation assigned to the zero in the 
second disjunct of (22f) would stem from the parallel coordination effected via the connective or: here, the antecedent NP 
and zero arguments bear the same semantic role (Patient), and the predication in the first disjunct is ellipsed in the second, 
with the manner by-phrase paralleling the means PP in the antecedent predication. In Blackwell (2001: 939, item (10d)), the 
author hierarchises the factors favouring a coreferential interpretation for the variety of types of Spanish indexical 
expressions she studies, placing Levinson’s alternations of given expression types in terms of the operation of the I- and M-
principles (as reflected in (23) for example) at the very end of her scale. This means that in many instances, the resolution of 
given expression types (in our case, complement zeros and overt inanimate object pronouns) may be determined without 
recourse to the I- and M-principles at all.  
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glass lid in (22f), and to the cooker’s glass lid in (22g). And in (22d), it would have been odd 
in place of the zero, so no clear implicature could be drawn.  
What seems clear in relation to the possible alternation between zero and it in this 
respect is this: the zero complements tend to refer more diffusely, more globally than the overt 
inanimate pronoun, which in several cases would have a more specific interpretation: in (22a) 
‘the room’ would be a more specific referent than ‘the house’ (of which the room in question 
is a part).  In (22d), while the zero complement refers in a general manner to the ambient scene 
as a whole (including the décor, the actors, etc.), the overt pronoun would refer more 
specifically to the stage qua stage. In (22g), the zero form would naturally target the current 
discourse segment’s topical referent ‘the cooker’s glass lid’, while the overt plural pronoun 
them would more naturally pick up a more local topical referent, the one introduced in subject 
position of the preceding sentence. The singular pronoun it, on the other hand, would refer 
back to the same discourse-segment topic (‘the cooker’s lid’) as the zero. Notice how the zero 
in the immediately preceding clause in the continuous text (represented by (22f)) refers to a 
more local topic (‘stubborn stains which may be stuck to the cooker’s glass lid’), whereas the 
zero complement of polish in (22g) (a continuation of the segment reproduced in (22f)) 
targets, as we have seen, the current local discourse topic (‘the cooker’s glass lid’). In this case 
too, the overt pronoun would have a more local referent than the zero.  Zero complements 
appear to be much more flexible than overt pronouns, and are more sensitive to context.  It is 




The fact that one or more non-first arguments of a transitive predicate are unrealized in the 
syntax does not mean that it is intransitive (i.e. monovalent) semantically. The constraints on 
the occurrence of null complements for such verbs in English would appear to be determined 
by the need to recover (i.e. to “license”) that or those non-first argument(s).  
In two of the three subtypes (the non-referential one and the anaphoric one), the zero 
complement of otherwise transitive (or ditransitive) verbs, adjectives or prepositions is 
licensed by the highly presupposed nature of its content: in the first case, an ‘inherent’ 
argument, part of the host predicate’s meaning, potentially narrowed to a more specific 
denotation type by features of the co(n)text; and in the second, a topical (and hence also highly 
presupposed) discourse referent licensed via the cotext and/or context of utterance of the host 
predicate, which is retrieved by the null complement. The former subtype is lexically 
presupposed, while the latter is discourse-pragmatically presupposed. As for the third of the 
three subtypes of null complement, the referential ‘discourse-new’ one, its existence is 
licensed via a combination of the lexical-semantic and Aktionsart structure of the host 
predicate (making available an appropriate inherent argument, e.g. ‘letter’ in the case of write 
iu its “correspond” sense) and certain referentially-relevant features of the host predication as 
a whole (tense, aspect, temporal or locative ‘framing’ adverbial modifiers etc.). Only the 
inherent-argument component of the discourse-new referent evoked is (lexically) presupposed 
in such a case.  Hence, this subtype may be viewed as the marked member of the set of null 
complement interpretation types.  
 Zero forms are claimed by linguists such as Givón and Ariel to be extremely high 
accessibility markers.  Indeed, they figure at the extreme “High Accessibility” pole of Ariel’s 
(2001: 31, item (2)) Accessibility Marking Scale, where each referential expression-type is 
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assigned a degree of accessibility relative to the status of its intended referent in the 
addressee’s memory, as assumed by the speaker at any given point in a discourse.  Zero forms 
do not figure at all in Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski’s (1993; 2000) “Givenness Hierarchy”, 
though as Nancy Hedberg (p.c.) points out, in their (1993) article, these authors did include 
zero NPs on the Givenness Hierarchies which they postulated for Spanish, Chinese, Japanese 
and Russian, claiming that their referents are of necessity in focus.  
In both the non-referential and the referential subtypes, the host predicator’s selection 
restrictions play a role: in the first case, in transferring them to the null complement, where 
they are then narrowed to a denotation type via the contextual domain of reference of the 
containing utterance; and in the second, in restricting the zero element’s ability to denote a 
referent (whether contextually salient or not). However, as we have seen, the telicity of the 
whole predication and the possible existence of a culturally-recognized stereotype may 
nevertheless license the intended referent and so permit the null form. The discussion in §5.2 
showed that, in general, “referential” zero complements refer more diffusely, more globally, 
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